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We study a spatial evolutionary rock-paper-scissors game with synchronized strategy updating. Players gain
their payoff from games with their four neighbors on a square lattice and can update their strategies simultaneously
according to the logit rule, which is the noisy version of the best-response dynamics. For the synchronized
strategy update two types of global oscillations (with an ordered strategy arrangement and periods of three and
six generations) can occur in this system in the zero noise limit. At low noise values, all nine oscillating phases are
present in the system by forming a self-organizing spatial pattern due to the comprising invasion and speciation
processes along the interfaces separating the different domains.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory gives us a general mathematical frame-
work to study interactive decision situations, when the aims
and choices of the players are potentially in conflict [1].
Evolutionary games are introduced to investigate multiagent
social and biological systems [2] using the concept of game
theory to quantify the interactions. Players can modify their
strategy following certain evolutionary rules taking into
account Darwinian selection in biological systems and/or
individual rationality in social systems. In recent decades,
many scientific fields approached game theory; physics proved
to be exceptional in handling the spatial systems because of the
direct applicability of statistical physics methods (for a survey
see [3,4]).
Now our investigations are focused on a spatial evolutionary
game where pair interactions are described by a cyclic three-
strategy game, called the rock-paper-scissors (RPS) game. For
the traditional RPS game, players choose simultaneously one
of three strategies: rock R, paper P, or scissors S. According to
the rules of the game, a strategy is superior to another and infe-
rior to the third one: rock beats scissors, scissors beat paper, and
paper beats rock, i.e., the game represents the cyclic dominance
of strategies. This type of cyclic dominance plays a crucial
role in the maintenance of biodiversity in ecological systems
[5–7] and can support the cooperative behavior in social
dilemmas when a third strategy (e.g., loners) is present [3,8,9].
Similarly, population-level cyclic motions were observed in a
human laboratory experiment of the discrete-time iterated RPS
game [10]. Moreover, biological experiments have justified
the presence of cyclic dominance in populations of bacteria
[11–13] and lizards [14,15]. These results have initiated
progressive activity to clarify the consequences of cyclic
dominance on the macroscopic, populationwide behavior. It
is found that these systems exhibit a nontrivial effect when the
cyclic symmetries are disturbed [16–19].
Very recently [20] it turned out that all symmetric 3×3
games can be decomposed as the linear combination of
potential and RPS games. For potential games, a potential
can be derived from the payoff matrix. The random sequential
application of the logit rule drives such systems into a state
where the stationary strategy distribution is described by
the Boltzmann distribution [21,22]. The RPS game can be
considered as the force responsible for driving the system
out of equilibrium by generating probability currents (entropy
production) throughout the microscopic states of multiagent
models [23,24].
For well-mixed populations, systems with RPS-type inter-
actions show global oscillations in the strategy frequencies
[25]. For structured populations, i.e., when the interaction
network of players is defined by a complex graph, the
oscillation can either evolve towards a limit cycle or its ampli-
tude increases continuously until only one strategy (species)
remains alive [26,27]. On two-dimensional lattices, due to the
short-range interactions, numerical simulations have indicated
the survival of all three strategies through the formation of
self-organizing patterns with rotating spirals [7,28–30]. The
general features of the self-organizing patterns (including
spatial correlations) have been studied quantitatively in several
previous papers [28,31–35]. In contrast to this behavior, in
finite one-dimensional systems, investigations indicate domain
coarsening [36,37] or fixation for stochastic imitation rules
[33,38,39]. In three-dimensional lattice systems, on the other
hand, vortices (rotating three-edged vertices where the three
types of interfaces meet) form closed loops [29,40] in analogy
to systems described by the complex Ginzburg-Landau model
(see, e.g., [41] and references therein).
Both the complexity of the system and the richness of
phenomena increase gradually if we study the effect of cyclic
dominance with four [42–51], five [52–56], six [43,57–60], or
nine [60–63] strategies. In particular, the studies about nine-
species systems help interpret the results of the present model
where one can observe nine ordered spatial arrangements of
the three strategies for synchronized strategy update. It is
worth mentioning that some of the mentioned three-, four-,
and six-species models are subsystems (systems where the use
of certain strategies are prohibited) of the nine-species one. In
the present model we can explore the competitive relationships
among nine strategy associations (which can be identified as
complex species) that are built up from three strategies and
possess an ordered spatial strategy arrangement.
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It is already well known that the macroscopic behavior of
a spatial evolutionary game depends mainly on the number of
strategies, the payoff matrix, the connectivity structure, and
the dynamical rule(s) controlling the choice of new strategies
[3,4,64–66]. The first dynamical rules were introduced to take
the Darwinian selection into consideration, allowing the popu-
lation of the fittest strategy (or species) to grow at the expense
of the weaker ones [67,68]. The first spatial evolutionary
game was introduced by Nowak and May [69,70] to study the
maintenance of cooperative behavior in a lattice model with
synchronized strategy update in analogy to cellular automata
[71]. In this model, players have modified their strategy at
discrete time steps by simultaneously adopting the strategy of
the neighbor who received the highest income in the previous
step. Subsequently, this deterministic model was modified by
the addition of stochastic noise to the imitation process [72];
these rules are used by the followers to study different versions
of evolutionary games [73–77]. In the meantime, additional
variants of the dynamical rules (including random sequential
stochastic updates) were introduced and studied systematically
(for a brief survey see [3,4,64]).
In the literature of physics and economics, a fundamentally
different set of dynamical rules was also introduced to take
human rationality into account: In the so-called logit rule
[22,78–81], players are capable of evaluating their income
by testing each available strategy and playing fictitious games
against their co-players, assuming the current (quenched) strat-
egy environment. The stochastic logit rule prefers to choose
the strategy providing the highest income in an exponential
manner. In the low noise limit, it becomes equivalent to
the best-response rule [82–84] that may be used to find
the Nash equilibria for certain types of games. This rule is
intimately related to equilibrium statistical physics because in
the case of multiagent potential games, the random sequential
applications of the logit rule drive the system into a Boltzmann
distribution [22].
In the present work we study an evolutionary RPS game
where players are located on the sites of a square lattice
with periodic boundary condition. Following one of the three
strategies, players play RPS games with their four nearest
neighbors in every discrete-time step and after collecting their
income, they are allowed to modify their strategy according to
a synchronized stochastic logit rule. It will be shown that this
system exhibits a curious pattern evolution. When visualizing
the spatiotemporal evolution of the strategy distribution, one
can observe domains with globally oscillating compositions
or structures analogously to the discrete clock models [85,86].
In fact, these domains represent different phases of limit
cycles and compete against each other via invasions along
the interfaces separating them.
The appearance of oscillations within these domains is
strongly related to the application of the synchronized logit
rule. We have to emphasize that the examination of syn-
chronous activity (e.g., armies marching, churches singing,
and communities dancing) has become a promising topic
within the social sciences as synchronized actions can increase
cooperation and social efficiency [87].
In the next section we describe the model and the technical
details of the simulation process. In Sec. III we discuss the
results of the model and present and explain the emerging
phenomena. In Sec. IV we summarize the main features of the
model.
II. MODEL
We consider a spatial evolutionary RPS game with syn-
chronized strategy updates at discrete times t = 0,1,2, . . . .
Players are located on the sites of a square lattice of size
N = L×L and gain their accumulated payoff from games
with their nearest neighbors. To facilitate the notation, we
use the three-dimensional unit vectors to denote the different
strategies, thus the player in the spatial location x can have the
strategy vectors
sx = R ≡
⎛
⎝
1
0
0
⎞
⎠, sx = S ≡
⎛
⎝
0
1
0
⎞
⎠, or sx = P ≡
⎛
⎝
0
0
1
⎞
⎠. (1)
Using this formalism, the income of player x can be calculated
as
ux(sx,sx ) =
∑
y∈x
sTx · M · sy, (2)
where sTx is the transpose of the player’s strategy vector and
sx stands for the strategy profile of players in the interaction
neighborhood x of player x, thus the summation runs over
the four nearest neighbors of player x. The matrix M contains
the payoff elements describing the cyclically dominant RPS
interactions, namely,
M =
⎛
⎝
0 1 −1
−1 0 1
1 −1 0
⎞
⎠ . (3)
After players collected their payoff at time t , they have the
option to adopt a (possibly) more successful strategy according
to the evolutionary aspect of the model. In this paper we use the
so-called logit rule. In this strategy adoption process players
check the payoff they could earn by adopting the possible
strategies, provided their neighbors keep using their present
strategies. Individuals keep their strategy or adopt a new
strategy with probabilities depending on these expectations:
Pr(s′x) =
exp[ux(s′x,sx )/K]∑
s′′x∈{R,P,S} exp[ux(s′′x,sx )/K]
. (4)
Here Pr(s′x) determines the probability for player x to adopt
strategy s′x ∈ {R,P,S} where ux(s′x,sx ) is the expected payoff
for playing strategy s′x with neighbors who play their present
strategies. In addition, K indicates the measure of noise (or
temperature) that can originate from different sources and
enables the occasional appearance of less successful strategies.
The probability of choosing a strategy with smaller expected
payoff increases with increasing K . Every player decides about
the strategy to adopt for the subsequent generation and then
the strategy of all players is updated at the same time, i.e.,
synchronized strategy updating is applied.
We studied the model by performing Monte Carlo simu-
lations on a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions.
The size of the lattice varied, depending on the actual problem,
from N = 4×104 to 106. Due to the dynamics and the emerged
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domain structure, these system sizes are large enough to avoid
finite-size effect problems. In most of the cases, the simulation
is started using random initial conditions where players have
equal chance to adopt one of the three different strategies
initially; however, to study the invasion phenomena we applied
prepared initial states. After a suitable transient time ttr,
simulation data are obtained by averaging over a ts sampling
time. These parameters are adjusted to the system behavior and
are changed typically between ttr = 1000–5000 Monte Carlo
steps (MCS) and ts = 104–106 MCS, where, within the time
unit (MCS), one full strategy updating sequence takes place,
i.e., each player modifies strategy once.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Examining the evolution of the model from a random initial
state, we can observe a fast cluster-formation process resulting
in domains that exhibit a synchronously oscillating internal
structure at sufficiently low noise levels. After some time the
domain-growing process stops and the system evolves into
a self-organizing spatiotemporal pattern. A typical snapshot
is shown in Fig. 1, where nine types of ordered strategy
arrangements can be distinguished. Apart from the three
obvious homogeneous clusters, there are six more that play
an important role during the evolutionary process. These
additional clusters have a chessboardlike structure where the
dark and light squares of the chessboard are occupied by
two different strategies. In fact, for a given strategy pair
we can distinguish chessboard and antichessboard patterns
where the sublattice occupancy is reversed. Since the sites
of the underlying square lattice are identical, chessboard and
antichessboard structures may seem to be the same (after all,
they are equivalent apart from a translation by one site), but
we are going to show that they interact quite differently with
other types of clusters, thus they have to be treated as different
FIG. 1. (Color online) Typical snapshot of the spatial distribution
of strategies in a block of 90×90 sites on a square lattice at K = 0.4.
Black stands for the R strategy, red (dark gray) for the P strategy, and
green (light gray) for the S strategy.
FIG. 2. (Color online) Flow diagram for the cyclic behavior of
domains. Solid (black) lines show how the domain composition
changes in every generation due to the logit strategy adoption rule.
The color code is the same as in Fig. 1. Domain types are denoted
by the appropriate strategy names. Note the different names for
the chessboard and antichessboard structures. Pure domains return
to the same state in three generations; chessboardlike associations
accomplish this in six generations. Interestingly, the nine available
strategy associations form two disjoint cycles instead of a full cycle.
types as well. We will refer to the different cluster types also
as strategy associations further on.
First we discuss what happens inside the homogeneous
domains in the limit K → 0 that corresponds to the synchro-
nized best-response dynamics. Following this myopic rule,
players choose the strategy providing the highest income,
assuming that co-players do not modify their strategy. If
initially (t = 0) all players use strategy R, then in the next
generation (t = 1) everyone will choose P and subsequently
(t = 2) S. In short, the homogeneous strategy distribution
changes cyclically as illustrated in the inner ring in Fig. 2.
These homogeneous states are denoted by the same strategy
pair (e.g., SS) positioned on the two sublattices. However,
these pairs can be different as well. For example, state PR
denotes a sublattice ordered strategy arrangement where the
first sublattice is uniformly occupied by P players and the
other one by R players. Within such a domain, P players
are satisfied and do not wish to modify their strategy, while
the dissatisfied R players are enforced uniformly to apply
strategy S, thus the system evolves into the PS state. In this
newly formed domain type, P players are motivated to change
their strategy to R while their co-players keep theirs in the next
step. Consequently, one can observe a cyclic behavior that is
illustrated in the outer ring in Fig. 2. It is worth mentioning
that similar cycles emerge when we consider only two players
using the same dynamical rule.
At low noise levels, point defects can appear inside the
ordered patterns. These defects, however, vanish in the next
generation as the ordered neighborhood dictates the course of
evolution. The frequency of isolated point defects increases
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Flow diagram for the invasion and specia-
tion processes between the different strategy associations (domains).
Arrows on the solid (black) lines show the winning association when
the two associations connected by the black line meet each other.
Dashed (blue) lines display the cases when the encounter of two
associations results in the appearance of a third species. The arrow
points toward the newly established association. The meaning of the
strategy colors is the same as in Fig. 2.
gradually with K and for sufficiently high noise levels, a small
island of a new phase can appear inside the domains. The
resultant dynamics is explored by systematically studying what
happens along the interfaces separating different domains.
Figure 3 shows the rather complex, intertwined invasion and
speciation relations between the different domain types. Black
lines indicate the cases when one of the two clusters connected
by the line overcomes the other and invades its territory. The
arrow points towards the winning type. The invasion process
takes place in a very complicated way as it takes into account
the cycles happening in the bulk of the clusters as well. To
demonstrate this we have created a scenario with a special
initial condition: Figure 4 shows the general layout for an
invasion process between two domains of different strategy
associations. The two half planes are filled up with different
associations (RS and RP) and their interaction is represented.
The first step (indicated by a star) catalyzing the invasion
happens as the result of a lower probability event. The green
(light gray) S player appearing in the middle column has an
expected payoff of 1 (PS = 1) instead of the payoff of 2 in the
case the R strategy (PR = 2) was adopted. Thus the probability
of the player to indeed adopt the suboptimal strategy is about
0.7% for K = 0.2, i.e.,
Pr(R) = e
1/K
e1/K + e2/K + e−3/K
K=0.2≈ 0.0067.
This kind of strategy adoption can happen at any place along
the domain interface, therefore the overall probability for the
starting step of the invasion grows substantially for longer
interfaces. As soon as such a steplike irregularity forms,
one of the domains can gain ground at the expense of the
other. The arrows (and states) following the second panel
of Fig. 4 are the result of the highest probability events:
The irregularity spreads upward and downward in every
generation until the whole column is filled up by the superior
domain. Invasion is induced by a (noise-dependent) random
event, but after that it continues basically deterministically.
To give an idea about the measure of the invasion’s noise
dependence, we calculated the probability of the above-
described steplike irregularity’s appearance for two additional
K values: Pr(R)K=0.1 = 0.000 05 and Pr(R)K=0.4 = 0.076.
Consequently, for higher noise values, the domain interfaces
become rough and the invasion proceeds very fast. On the other
hand, in the low noise limit, the domain structure is basically
frozen. Similarly to the appearance of the above-described
steplike irregularity, other strategies can appear at the domain
boundaries as well; however, the likelihood of these events
is several magnitudes smaller than that of the event inducing
the invasion. The successive panels of the figure demonstrate
the six-generation-long cyclic behavior of the domains in a
spectacular way.
We have to emphasize that the above invasion process only
considered vertical (or horizontal) domain interfaces. For the
propagation of diagonal interfaces, no noise-induced starting
step is needed. The diagonal interface is essentially a series of
steplike irregularities, thus the whole front moves by one site
perpendicular to the interface in every generation as the result
of the most likely strategy changes.
Besides the black lines in Fig. 3, there are dashed blue
lines connecting three strategy associations. These dashed
lines indicate cases when the encounter of two domains gives
birth to a third type of cluster that consumes the first two. The
arrow points towards this newly established domain type. This
process can also be considered as speciation: The encounter
of two species (associations) generates a third one. The actual
course of speciation takes place similarly to that of invasion:
The third species forms at the interface and then it consumes
both original associations according to the scenario described
in Fig. 4. We illustrate this process in Fig. 5 on a larger scale.
FIG. 4. (Color online) Propagation of a steplike irregularity at the boundary of two domains. The first step of the invasion (indicated by a
star) happens with a lower noise-dependent probability. The propagation of the irregularity displayed on the subsequent panels is, however, the
result of the most probable strategy adoptions. The six-generation-long cyclic behavior of the domains can be observed as well.
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t t t
FIG. 5. (Color online) Snapshots showing the course of a speci-
ation event at K = 0.3. The new species SR emerges at the boundary
of the RR and SP domains.
In some cases, the invasion process goes on in a slightly
different way. A third type of strategy association can form at
the interface, however, in this instance, this new species does
not emerge victoriously; it only helps one of the domains to
invade the other. It pushes forward into the territory of the
inferior domain and at the same time the superior domain
incorporates its territory from the other side. As a result, the
new species acts as a catalyst for invasion in a narrow strip and
as soon as the region of the inferior domain is consumed, this
new species is annihilated by the superior domain as well.
For the quantitative investigation of the spatial patterns
we have determined the autocorrelation function c(z) that
measures the probability of finding strategy R at two sites
with a horizontal (or vertical) distance z between the sites.
Namely,
c(z) = 〈nx(R)nx+z(R)〉x,t − 〈nx(R)〉2x,t , (5)
where 〈· · · 〉x,t denotes averaging over the lattice sites x and
time t in the stationary state and the occupation number
nx(R) = 1 if sx = R and nx(R) = 0 otherwise. Evidently,
similar correlation functions can be defined for the other two
strategies, however, these quantities are equivalent due to the
cyclic symmetries.
As the spatial pattern is a mixture of homogeneous and
chessboardlike domains, an oscillation (with a period of 2) can
be observed in the autocorrelation function where c(z) tends
to zero with a different speed at the odd and even values of
z. At high noise values, the correlations vanish exponentially.
In contrast, at low noise level, a suppressed oscillation can be
observed in c(z) at even distances as illustrated in Fig. 6 for
K = 0.3 and 0.4. The estimated value where c(z) becomes zero
is proportional to the average linear domain size that increases
when the noise is decreased. The quantitative analysis of
the system’s behavior in the low noise limit is prevented by
technical difficulties related to the extremely slow motion of
interfaces.
IV. SUMMARY
We have studied an evolutionary RPS game with my-
opic synchronized strategy updates on a square lattice. We
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Autocorrelation function versus distance
of even integers for three different noise levels. Dashed line shows
the zero level. The system size used in the simulations was 400×400.
observed peculiar self-organizing patterns including invasion
and speciation processes. One of the striking features of
these globally oscillating patterns is that we can distinguish
domains representing ordered phases of the three- or six-step-
long limit cycles. These limit cycles can be considered as
oscillating solutions consisting of strategy associations with
spatiotemporal structure governing the system’s behavior at
small sizes and low noise levels. The self-organizing patterns
emerge in a sufficiently large system if it is started from a
random initial state.
The self-organizing pattern formation of these domains
is maintained by invasions between them. The direction of
invasion is determined by the RPS-type competitions between
the components of the oscillating domains. It is found that
this direction is preserved during the consecutive steps. The
invasion directions reflect symmetries that are assumed in
models of bacterial warfare where bacteria use two toxins
(and antitoxins) during their evolutionary competition. Besides
the cyclic invasion phenomena we could observe speciation
processes when a new phase emerges and extends along
the interfaces of the original domains. All these features
are summarized in an extended flow diagram characterizing
the invasion and speciation processes between the strategy
associations.
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